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会议预告|微观经济学工作坊系列之三(20191126)

2019-11-22

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  报告题目:On the Optimal Design of Biased Contests

  主讲:吴泽南  

  点评:欧阳耀福

  主持:杜创

  时间:2019112613:30--15:00

  地点:北京市文兴东街1号国谊宾馆南楼2层第1会议室

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  报告摘要:

  This paper explores the optimal design of biased contests. A designer imposes an identity-dependent treatment on contestants, which varies the balance of the playing field. A generalized lottery contest typically yields no closed-form equilibrium solutions, which nullifies the usual implicit programming approach to optimal contest design and limits analysis to restricted settings. We propose an alternative approach that allows us to circumvent this difficulty and characterize the optimum in a general setting under a wide array of objective functions without solving for the equilibrium explicitly. Our technique applies to broad contexts, and the analysis it enables generates novel insights into incentive provision in contests and their optimal design. For instance, we demonstrate that the conventional wisdom of leveling the playing field, which is obtained in limited settings in previous studies, does not generally hold.

  主讲人简介:

  吴泽南,现任北京大学经济学院助理教授。于2015年获宾夕法尼亚大学经济学博士学位,同年任教于北京大学经济学院经济学系。研究领域为应用微观理论,产业快3在线投注平台理论以及保险市场。研究成果在RAND Journal of EconomicsJournal of Economics & Management StrategyGeneva Risk and Insurance ReviewOxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and FinanceEconomics Letters等期刊上发表。

  供稿:中国社科院经济所微观经济学研究室

  (编稿:张佶烨;审校:王砚峰)

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